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This paper contributes to the analysis of the eﬀects of demand structure on long-
term growth. Introducing non-homothetic preferences in an otherwise standard quality-
model, we ﬁrst show that disparities in purchasing power generate positive R&D in-
vestment by quality leaders. This result is obtained with complete equal treatment
in the R&D ﬁeld between the incumbent patentholder and the challengers as well as
without any concavity in the R&D cost function: in our framework, the incentive for a
leader to invest in R&D stems from the possibility for an incumbent having innovated
twice in a row to eﬃciently discriminate between rich and poor consumers display-
ing diﬀerences in their willingness to pay for quality. We hence exemplify a so far
overlooked demand-driven rationale for innovation by incumbents. We then move to
analyzing the impact of inequalities on long-term growth in our quality-ladder frame-
work, and ﬁnd that a lower level of wealth disparities always leads to an increase in the
long-run growth rate. Finally, we show that beyond this negative impact on growth,
inequalities also inﬂuence the allocation of the overall R&D eﬀort between incumbents
and challengers: a higher level of inequalities will in most cases lead to a bigger share
of the overall R&D investment to be carried out by quality leaders.
Keywords: Growth, Innovation, Income inequalities.
JEL classiﬁcation: O3, O4, F4.
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11 Introduction
Taking into account the impact of income distribution on the demand structure is
a growing concern for the analysis of several macroeconomic phenomenons. Structural
change models have recently shown how modiﬁcations in aggregate demand as households
become richer can cause long-term alterations in the production and employment structure
(Matsuyama, 2002; Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2008). In an international trade framework,
income distribution within a country has lately been identiﬁed as a potential determinant
of the quality of its exports, beyond supply considerations such as scale economies or factor
endowments (Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). Finally, from a long-term growth perspective, the
distribution of purchasing power across households and its eﬀects on the proﬁtability of
a new product have been demonstrated to inﬂuence the intensity of innovation activities
(Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006).
The present paper contributes to this last strand of literature by showing that in the
case of vertical innovation, the distribution of income within an economy decisively aﬀects
the incentives to invest in R&D activities of both challenger ﬁrms and incumbent paten-
tholders. More precisely, while existing quality-ladder models featuring income inequality
(Zweimuller and Brunner, 2005; Li, 2003) preclude any R&D investment by the current
quality leader,1 we claim that the existence of industry leaders investing in R&D to improve
their own products can actually be explained by existing disparities in purchasing power
among households. Indeed, leaders having at their disposal several quality-diﬀerentiated
versions of their core product (obtained through successive innovations) are observed to
simultaneously commercialize diﬀerent price/quality bundles, aimed at diﬀerent groups of
consumers diﬀering in income.2 This is a well-explored microeconomic result (Mussa and
Rosen, 1978): for a monopolist, serving costumers who do not care much for quality creates
negative externalities, since it hinders the captation of costumer surplus from those who
have a stronger taste for quality. In a microeconomic static set-up, the monopolist (who is
assumed to have access to a whole product line) then internalizes the negative externalities
by inducing less enthusiastic consumers to buy lower quality items charged at a lower price,
opening the possibility of charging higher prices to more adamant buyers of high quality
units. In our dynamic framework, the monopolist only has access to as many qualities as
times he has innovated: internalization of the negative externality then leads to innovation
by incumbent.
We hence extend and deepen the existing analysis of the impact of demand structure
on innovation-based growth and provide a new, demand-based rationale for continued in-
1Indeed, in standard quality-ladder models (Segerstrom et al., 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991b;
Aghion and Howitt, 1992), quality leaders do not participate to the next innovation race: this absence of
R&D investment by incumbents, known as the Arrow (1962) eﬀect, is justiﬁed by the fact that innovating
quality leaders would only cannibalize their own business.
2Intel currently sells three diﬀerent families of microprocessors (Core, Pentium and Celeron), displaying
diﬀerent levels of speed and performance; Microsoft commercializes simultaneously Windows XP, Vista and
7; Nokia and Samsung sell numerous quality-diﬀerentiated mobile phones, displaying signiﬁcant variations
in prices and oﬀered functionalities.
2vestment in R&D by quality leaders.
We feature a traditional quality-ladder framework except for the use of non-homothetic
preferences, hence allowing for more than one quality to be consumed at the equilibrium
in the presence of diﬀerences in wealth endowment. This property is obtained by imposing
unit consumption of the quality good, the rest of a consumer’s income being spent on a
standardized (composite) good: a given consumer will then buy the quality that, given its
price, oﬀers them the highest utility. The presence of heterogenous consumers in terms of
income, combined with strategic pricing of ﬁrms producing diﬀerent qualities, might then
result in a situation of natural oligopoly (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) with more than one
quality being produced and sold at the equilibrium. By contrast, in the standard quality-
ladder models (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a; Segerstrom et al., 1990), the quality good
is divisible and the preferences of the consumers are hence homothetic. Monopoly pricing
by the current quality leader then ensures that only the highest price-adjusted quality is
consumed at the equilibrium, even when diﬀerences in wealth endowments are allowed for:
the poorest consumers only consume a lower share of the top quality good.
Using such a utility speciﬁcation, we then model a two-class society in which the level
of a consumer’s income determines his willingness to pay for the highest quality. In such a
framework, a challenger winning the latest innovation race and being the producer of the
highest quality needs to decide between two alternatives: capturing the whole market by
charging a price suﬃciently low to appeal to the poorest households, or selling its product
at a higher price only to the wealthiest consumers, at the cost of abandoning the rest of the
market to its direct competitor (i.e. the previous quality leader). The proﬁts of such an
innovator are hence aﬀected by income distribution through two eﬀects, already identiﬁed
by Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) in an horizontal innovation setting: a price eﬀect and a
market size eﬀect. Opting for a price that is acceptable for all consumers entails a positive
market size eﬀect but a negative price eﬀect on the innovator’s proﬁts, since it prevents
the latter from reaping maximum surplus from the higher willingness to pay of wealthier
consumers. Charging the highest price acceptable for rich consumers has a positive price
eﬀect but a negative market size eﬀect on proﬁts of the current leader, since it means that
the poor consumers will keep buying the second-best quality from the previous leader.
For a successful challenger, the price and the market size eﬀect can hence only work in
opposite directions. On the other hand, an incumbent winning an innovation race is able
to reconcile both eﬀects, since he then has two successive qualities at its disposal: he
can thus eﬃciently discriminate between rich and poor consumers by oﬀering two distinct
price/quality bundles, capturing the whole market and reaping the maximum surplus from
the wealthy consumers at the same time.
In such a framework, we model R&D races with constant returns, and show that without
any advantage of any kind in the R&D ﬁeld, the incumbent still invests a strictly positive
amount in R&D. Such a behavior directly stems from the existing increment between the
proﬁts realized when being a successful challenger and a successful incumbent. Hence,
3while so far the incentives for innovation by quality leaders have essentially been modeled
as stemming from the structure of the R&D process, this paper provides a demand-driven
incentive for investment in R&D by incumbents. Also, by acknowledging the existence and
assessing the importance of incumbent investment in R&D when facing purchasing power
disparities, we are able to contribute further to the analysis of the eﬀects of inequalities
on innovation. We ﬁrst show that in a majority of cases a lower level of inequalities is
beneﬁcial for long-term growth, demonstrating a negative relationship between wealth dis-
parities and growth in a quality-ladder framework. We then also bring to light an impact
of inequalities so far overlooked, showing that the distribution of income will also inﬂuence
the allocation of the overall R&D eﬀort between incumbents and challengers: most of the
time, a higher level of inequalities will lead to a bigger share of the overall R&D investment
to be carried out by quality leaders.
Relation to literature.
Our paper is part of the growing body of literature studying the occurrence and the
impact on long-term growth of innovation by incumbents. Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999)
as well as Segerstrom (2007) have obtained positive investment in R&D by the incumbent
by assuming that the expertise granted by quality leadership confers R&D cost advantages.
Combined with diminishing returns to R&D eﬀorts at the ﬁrm level, this assumption
ensures that both incumbents and challengers participate to R&D races. Etro (2004, 2008)
models sequential patent races with concave R&D costs where the incumbent, acting as a
Stackelberg leader, is given the opportunity to make a strategic precommitment to a given
level of R&D investment: the quality leader then has an incentive to invest in R&D in order
to deter outsiders’ entry. Acemoglu and Cao (2010) provide a model where incumbents and
challengers participate to two diﬀerent kinds of R&D races, diﬀering in terms of costs and
rewards: leaders invest in R&D to improve their products (incremental innovation), while
challengers participate to R&D races in the hope of leapfrogging the existing incumbent
(radical innovation). All those models have hence explored various possible incentives
for innovation by incumbent stemming from the structure of the R&D process, i.e. from
the supply side, while our paper on the other hand provides a demand-based rationale for
leader R&D, stemming from the negative externalities generated by wealth inequalities on
an innovator’s proﬁts.
Aghion et al. (2001) analyze the inﬂuence of the product market structure on inno-
vation intensity, developing a framework in which goods of diﬀerent quality are imperfect
substitutes and can therefore coexist in the market. They show that the perspective to
lessen the competition pressure (and broaden the market share) provides the incentive for
the incumbent to carry out positive R&D investments in order to improve its own product,
while the challenger invests in order to leapfrog the current leader. They however preclude
free entry, by exogenously imposing that only the incumbent monopolist and a single out-
sider invest in R&D, while our paper on the other hand endogenizes both investment by
4incumbents and challenger entry.
Finally, all those papers assume concavity of the R&D cost function in order to en-
sure positive investment by both the incumbent and the challengers.3 Our paper on the
other hand provides a rationale generating positive investment by both R&D leaders and
challengers even under the assumption of constant returns to R&D eﬀort at the ﬁrm level.4
This paper is also closely related to the literature examining the relationship be-
tween long-term growth and inequalities operating through the demand side. Foellmi and
Zweimuller (2006) model a similar two-class society, and demonstrate that a lower level of
inequalities is systematically detrimental to long-term growth. They however obtain this
result in an horizontal innovation framework, where the rewards for innovation are from
a diﬀerent nature than in Schumpeterian models. Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) on the
other hand have studied the impact of disparities in purchasing power of households in a
quality-ladder framework, showing that a reduction in the level of inequalities within the
economy (whether it be through a decrease in the share of the population being poor or
a redistribution from the rich to the poor) is beneﬁcial for innovation intensity and hence
for growth. While we rely on their modeling strategy and obtain results similar to theirs
concerning the challenger innovation rate, their model however does not feature innovation
by incumbent, hence only capturing part of the eﬀects of the level of inequalities on the
innovation rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present our model, while
section 5 studies the steady state equilibrium. Section 6 then analyzes the eﬀects of the
extent of inequalities on the innovation intensity . Section 7 concludes.
2 Consumers
There is a ﬁxed number L of consumers that live inﬁnitely and supply one unit of
labor each period, paid at a constant wage w. While all consumers have the same wage
income, they are assumed to diﬀer with respect to asset ownership ωi(t): along Zweimuller
and Brunner (2005), we assume a two-class society with rich (R) and poor (P) consumers,
being distinguished by their wealth (respectively ωR and ωP).
The share of poor consumers within the population is denoted by β. The extent of
inequalities within the economy is determined by this share, as well as by the repartition
between rich and poor of the aggregate wealth Ω. d ∈ (0,1) is deﬁned as the ratio of
the value of assets owned by a poor consumer relative to the average per-capita wealth:
d = ωP
Ω/L. Given d, the wealth position of the rich can be computed as dR =
1−βd
1−β . We
3A notable exception is Cozzi (2007), who shows that in the case of constant returns at the ﬁrm level,
the incumbent is indiﬀerent to its own R&D investment in the standard Schumpeterian environment. We
however are able to clearly diﬀerentiate between incumbent and challenger R&D investment amounts, since
the two kinds of actors do not face the same incentives in our model.
4As it has been demonstrated in a previous version of our paper (Latzer, 2010), our results are robust
to the use of a concave R&D cost function.
5hence have ωP = dΩ





Current income yi(t) of an individual belonging to the group i (i = P,R) is then of the
form:
yi(t) = w + rωi(t) (1)
with r being the interest rate.
Current income is then spent for the consumption of a single unit of a quality good
with price pi(t) (depending on the quality qi(t) chosen by the consumer at time t), and
of ci(t) units of a standardized good with price 1. Preferences are non-homothetic, with
the instantaneous utility of a consumer of type i being described by the following utility
function:
ui(t) = lnci(t) + lnqi(t) = ln(yi(t) − pi(t)) + lnqi(t) (2)
As shown by Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), at time τ the intertemporal decision















with ρ being the rate of time preference. Given an expected time path for both the
interest rate r(t) and the relation between quality and price pi(t,qi(t)), it is then possible
to determine the optimal time path of ci(t), the consumption of the standardized good,
and of qi(t), the chosen quality of the unit consumption good.
For any given time path of expenditures for the quality good pi(t,qi(t)) that does
not exhaust life-time resources, the optimal path of consumption expenditures on the




= r(t) − ρ (3)
The optimal time path of qi(t), on the other hand, cannot be characterized by a diﬀer-
ential equation, since the quality choice is discrete. We notice however that the choice in
qi(t) is made simultaneously along with the decision on pi(t) by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
We hence set aside the choice of quality on the part of consumers until having deﬁned the
market and price structure for the quality good.
63 Market structure and pricing
There is a linear technology for the production of the standardized good, with labor as
the unit input. We use the price of this standardized good as the numeraire, and since the
market is assumed to be competitive, unit labor input is 1/w.
The market for the quality good is non-competitive. At any date t, we assume that a
continuum of qualities qj(t), j = 0,−1,−2,... exist and can be produced, with q0(t) being
the best quality, q−1(t) the second-best, etc. Labor is the only input, with constant unit
labor requirement a < 1.5 Two successive quality levels diﬀer by a ﬁxed factor k > 1:
qj(t) = k.qj−1(t).
We will now deﬁne more precisely the structure of the quality good market. The
quality good being characterized by unit consumption and ﬁxed quality increments, ﬁrms
use prices as strategic variables. We assume they know the shares of groups P and R in the
population, the respective incomes yR and yP as well as the preferences of the consumers,
but that they cannot distinguish individuals by income. In order to describe the strategic
decisions operated by ﬁrms, we now deﬁne pT
i,{j,j−m}, the “threshold” price for which a
consumer belonging to group i is indiﬀerent between quality j and quality j − m, i.e.
ln(yi−pT
i,{j,j−m})+lnqj = ln(yi−pj−m)+lnqj−m. Considering the fact that qj = kj−mqm,
solving for pT











i,{j,j−m} is the maximum price that the ﬁrm selling the quality j can charge to
a consumer belonging to the group i in order to have a positive market share, when facing
the ﬁrm selling quality j−m. As one can see, this threshold price positively depends on the
income yi of consumer i, as well as on the price charged by the competitor pj−m. Having
deﬁned this threshold price, and along with Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), we can state:
Lemma 1: If pj ≥ wa holds for the price of some quality qj, j = −1,−2,..., then for the
producer of any higher quality qj+m, 1 ≤ m ≤ −j, there exists a price pj+m > wa, such
that any consumer prefers quality qj+m to qj.







km is a weighted average
of yi and pj. Given the fact that only prices being below their income are taken into account
by consumers i, we have that pj < yi, and we can hence conclude that pT
j+m,j > pj. Hence,
it is always possible for the producer of the quality j + m to set a price pj+m > pj ≥ wa
such that pj+m ≤ pT
i,{j+m,j}, i.e. such that quality qj+m is preferred to quality qj by the
consumers of group i. This ends the proof. ￿
5Given the fact we have unit consumption of the quality good, a necessarily has to be inferior to 1.
7Hence, if we take for granted that a producer never sells its quality at a price below the
unit production cost wa, it is always possible for the producer of a higher quality to drive
him out of the market, while still making strictly positive proﬁts. Along this result, any
ﬁrm entering the market with a new highest quality q0 has to consider the following trade-
oﬀ concerning the pricing of its product: setting the highest possible price for any given
group of clients, vs. lowering its price in order to capture a further group of consumers.
It is then possible to show that in an economy characterized by two distinct groups of
consumers (R and P), the equilibrium has the following properties:
Lemma 2: At equilibrium,
(1) The highest quality is produced,
(2) At most the two highest qualities q0 and q−1 are actually produced,
(3) The equilibrium price p−1 fulﬁlls wa ≤ p−1 ≤ pT
P,{−1,−2}, with pT
P,{−1,−2} denoting the
maximum price the producer of the q−1 quality can set in order to deter the producer of the
q−2 quality from entry.
The proof is made in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005). The intuition is that since there
are only two distinct groups of consumers, at most two distinct qualities can be sold, and
at least one is always consumed, since it is assumed every individual buys one unit of the
quality good. By Lemma 1, higher qualities drive out lower ones, hence the two qualities
being still possibly active are q0 and q−1. At equilibrium, no ﬁrm can make a loss, hence
the price pj being charged for any quality qj active on the market is necessarily superior
or equal to the production cost wa. Finally, p−1 ≤ pT
P,{−1,−2} follows from the fact that
otherwise the producer of quality q−2 could enter the market.
As it can be seen from lemma 2, two diﬀerent situations are possible for the equilibrium
market structure and associated prices: either only the top quality good q0 is sold to both
groups of consumers (groups P and R), or the top quality good is sold only to the rich
consumers (group R) while the second best quality good is sold to the poor consumers
(group P). Lemma 1 shows that the decision regarding the market structure belongs to the
producer having at its disposal the highest quality q0, considering that he is always able
to set a price that will drive its competitors out.
In Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) as well as in other quality ladder models studying the
eﬀects of inequality on growth through the product market (Zweimuller, 2000; Li, 2003),
when two qualities are simultaneously sold on the market they are systematically designed
and produced by two distinct ﬁrms. Indeed, in those models the incumbent does not engage
in the next R&D race: when a new innovation occurs, the successful challenger becomes
the quality leader, the previous quality leader becomes the producer of the second-best
quality (whether he is still active or not depends on the pricing decision taken by the new
quality leader), while the producer of the previous second-best quality is anyway driven out
8of the market. These papers hence bear a close relationship with the static models of price
competition in oligopoly markets with unit consumption of the quality good (Gabszewicz
and Thisse, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983). In this case, whether or not the second-
best quality is being sold is solely determined by the distribution of income in the considered
economy, since the latter determines the optimal pricing chosen by the quality leader. In
other words, the equilibrium market structure in those models is deterministic, being set
once and for all depending on the values assigned to the parameters β and d: it is not
altered by the successive quality jumps.
In our model however, another possibility has to be taken into account: a unique
producer can have at its disposal the two highest qualities, since we leave the
opportunity for the incumbent to still engage in R&D races. If the incumbent
wins the next innovation race, he then faces the monopoly pricing problem of a ﬁrm having
at its disposal a spectrum of quality-diﬀerentiated goods (Mussa and Rosen, 1978).
Hence, in our model, the equilibrium market structure is stochastic, since it does de-
pend on the outcome of the successive innovation races. In other words, the equilibrium
market structure is a random process that we denote by M(t). We deﬁne the state space
of this stochastic process as {(SC),(SI)}, with the possible states (SC) and (SI) being
characterized in the following way:6
• “Successful Challenger” (SC) state: a challenger is the winner of the last R&D
race, i.e. the new quality leader is diﬀerent from the former quality leader. The new
quality leader then only has the highest quality at its disposal. One or two qualities
can then be sold on the market, depending on the pricing strategy chosen by the new
quality leader (which will itself depend on the wealth distribution in the economy).
The market structure in this state can then either be a monopoly (only quality q0
is sold), with the new quality leader charging a price that enables him to capture
the whole market, or a duopoly (both qualities q0 and q−1 are sold), with the new
quality leader charging a higher price and serving only the upper part of the market,
leaving the lower part to the second-best quality producer. One must however keep
in mind that though either a monopoly or a duopoly, the market structure inside the
(SC) case is not a stochastic process: for given values of the parameters β and d, it
is deterministically determined.
• “Successful Incumbent” (SI) state: the former quality leader, still carrying out
R&D, is the winner of the last R&D race, and hence has two successive qualities
at its disposal. According to lemma 2, the market structure is then necessarily a
monopoly. However, as we will show, the quality leader will then oﬀer two diﬀerent
quality/price bundles in order to discriminate between the groups P and R of the
population (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), and hence both qualities q0 and q−1 are sold.
6As it will be further demonstrated, the stochastic process M(t) is a continuous time Markov process
for which it will be possible to determine a stationary distribution.
9Figure 1: Two possible states
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬂuctuations between the two possible states over time. We will
now describe in more details the possible market structures, prices and associated proﬁts
in the two existing states.
3.1 Prices and proﬁts in the (SC) state
As already stated, the market structure in the (SC) state is deterministically either a
monopoly or a duopoly, depending on the extent of inequalities in wealth distribution in
the economy.
3.1.1 Case 1: Monopoly price regime in the (SC) state
It corresponds to the case where the wealth structure makes it optimal for the quality
leader to set a price enabling him to sell the unique quality he has at its disposal to the
entire market, driving the former quality leader out of the market.
pT
i,{0,−1} is the maximum price the producer of quality q0 can set in order to capture the
consumers of the group i for a given price p−1 of quality q−1. We ﬁrst notice that setting a
price that captures the consumers belonging to the group P automatically ensures that the
rich consumers will consume the highest quality q0 too, since pT
i,{0,−1} is increasing along
yi. Hence, the optimal price chosen by a quality leader willing to capture the whole market
is pT
P,{0,−1}, given that the producer of quality q−1 engages in marginal cost pricing (i.e.
q−1 = wa).













L . We also deﬁne the associated proﬁts πM:
πM = L(pM − wa)
103.1.2 Case 2: Duopoly price regime in the (SC) state
It corresponds to the case where the wealth structure makes it optimal for the new
quality leader to set a price capturing only the upper part of the market, abandoning the
lower part to the producer of the second-best quality. The two highest qualities q0 and q−1
are then sold at the equilibrium, being produced by two diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) have deﬁned a possible equilibrium in that case, under
the condition on the punishment strategies of the inﬁnitely repeated pricing game that
no ﬁrm is punished if it changes its price without aﬀecting the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt (Proof:
cf Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), p. 242). At this equilibrium, the new quality leader
optimally chooses to charge the highest possible price enabling him to capture the group
of rich consumers pT
R,{0,−1}, given the expected strategy of the producer of the second-best
quality. The former quality leader charges the highest possible price enabling him to cap-
ture the poor group of consumers pT
P,{−1,−2}, given that the producer of quality q−2 engages
in marginal cost pricing.7
We call pL the price being charged by the new quality leader for the highest quality,


























L . We also deﬁne the associated proﬁts πL for the quality leader and πF for
the producer of the second-best quality:
πF = β(pF − wa), πL = (1 − β)(pL − wa)
Selection of the equilibrium price regime. Having described the prices and proﬁts for
both possible market structures, we still need to deﬁne under which parametric conditions
on wealth distribution each price regime occurs. It can be however be seen from the
expressions of πM, πL and πF that they depend on the endogenous equilibrium values
of overall wealth Ωs (s ∈ {SC,SI}) in both possible cases. We will hence extensively
comment the parametric conditions governing the occurence of each regime once we have
fully deﬁned the steady state equilibrium of our economy (section 5.3). For the time being
however, it is suﬃcient to keep in mind that the choice of the market structure pertains to
the new quality leader, who, considering the distribution parameters d and β, optimally
decides to set a price capturing either the whole market or only the rich consumers.
7We insist once more on the fact that the strategy chosen in this case by the producer of quality q−1 is
only made possible because of the decision of the new quality leader to charge a higher price, capturing only
the upper part of the market: had the new leader found optimal to charge p
T
P,{0,−1} instead of p
T
R,{0,−1}
for quality q0, the former leader would have been driven out of the market and we would be back to case
1 (monopoly price regime).
113.2 Prices and proﬁts in the (SI) state
Two qualities are systematically sold in the (SI) state. Indeed, a leader having at its
disposal two successive qualities and facing two groups of consumers having diﬀerent levels
of income will always ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer two distinct price-quality bundles in order to
maximize its proﬁt (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). The market structure is then a monopoly.
The price charged by the monopolist for its second-best quality will be the maximal price
enabling him to capture the poor group of consumers pT
P,{−1,−2}, given that the producer
of quality q−2 engages in marginal cost pricing. The price charged for the highest quality





SI the prices being charged respectively to the rich and poor consumers




















with the associated proﬁts for the discriminating monopolist:
πSI = βL(pP




SI being of the form:
yP









We hence notice that the prices charged for the two qualities in the duopoly case of
the (SC) state and in the (SI) state are strongly similar, even if the number of active ﬁrms
are diﬀerent. However, the overall wealth (Ωs, s ∈ (SC,SI)) is diﬀerent depending on
the state the economy ﬁnds itself in, hence making it necessary to clearly diﬀerentiate the
prices charged in the two possible cases in which 2 qualities are sold.
Having deﬁned the possible market structure, prices and proﬁts in every possible state,
we can now move to the description of the R&D process, which is the engine of growth in
our model.
4 R&D sector
Firms carry out R&D in order to discover the next quality level. Two types of ﬁrms
engage in R&D races: the current quality leader (incumbent), and followers (challengers).
We assume free entry, with every ﬁrm having access to the same R&D technology. Innova-
tions are random, and occur for a given ﬁrm i according to a Poisson process of hazard rate
φi. Labor is the only input, and we assume constant returns to R&D at the ﬁrm level: in
order to have an immediate probability of innovating of φi, a ﬁrm needs to hire Fφi labor
units, F being a positive constant inversely related to the eﬃciency of the R&D technology.8
8The condition of constant marginal costs of R&D can however be loosened, since a previous version of
our model (Latzer, 2010) has demonstrated that our results are robust to the use of a concave R&D cost
12We deﬁne vC as the value of a challenger ﬁrm, vSC as the expected present value of a
quality leader having innovated once, and vSI as the expected present value of a quality
leader having innovated twice. Free entry and constant returns to scale imply that R&D
challengers have no market value, whatever state the economy ﬁnds itself in: vC = 0.
Free entry of challengers in the successive R&D races also yields the traditional equality
constraint between expected proﬁts of innovating for the ﬁrst time φCvSC and engaged
costs φCwF (free entry condition):
vSC = wF (5)
The incumbent on the other hand participates to the race with the advantage of having
already innovated at least once, and hence being the current producer of the leading quality
in case (SC)/of the two highest qualities in case (SI). It is hence not subject to the free
entry constraint of equality between engaged costs and expected proﬁts.9
In the (SC) state, he faces the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
rvSC = max
φI,SC≥0
{πM − wFφI,SC + φI,SC(vSI − vSC) + φC(vF − vSC)} (6)
The incumbent in the (SC) state earns the proﬁts πSC (the precise form of πSC depends
on the equilibrium price regime and corresponding market structure in the (SC) state),
and incurs the R&D costs wFφI,SC. With instantaneous probability φI,SC, the leader
innovates once more, the economy jumps to the state (SI), and the value of the leader
(now producing and selling two distinct qualities) climbs to vSI. However, with overall
instantaneous probability φC, some R&D challenger innovates, and the quality leader falls
back to being a follower: its value drops to vF (again, the precise form of vF depends on
the market structure in the (SC) case). The economy then remains in the state (SC), and
only one quality is produced.
In the (SI) state, the incumbent faces the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
rvSI = max
φI,SI≥0
{πSI − wFφI,SI + φI,SI(vSI − vSI) + φC(vF − vSI)} (7)
The incumbent in the (SI) state earns the proﬁts πSI of a monopolist being able to dis-
criminate between rich and poor consumers by oﬀering two distinct price/quantity bundles.
He incurs the R&D costs wFφI,SI. With instantaneous probability φI,SI, the incumbent
innovates once more, in which case its value remains vSI, since we have established with
Lemma 2 that at most two successive quantities are sold at equilibrium. Hence, the in-
cumbent will still be the producer of the two qualities being sold, but he will drive himself
function.
9The incumbent is however subject to exactly the same R&D costs and participates to the same race
than the challengers, leading to the same size of innovation is successful: this is why we claim that they
do not beneﬁt from any advantage in the R&D ﬁeld.
13out of the market for the former quality q−1, that has become quality q−2 with the latest
quality jump. The economy then remains in state (SI). With instantaneous probability
φC,10 some R&D follower innovates, and the quality leader then falls back to being an
R&D challenger: its value falls to vF. The economy then jumps to the state (SC), and
only the new highest quality is sold by the latest successful innovator.
In both states, the incumbent ﬁrm chooses its R&D eﬀort so as to maximize the right-
hand side of its Bellman equation. (6) and (7) then yield the following ﬁrst order conditions:
vSI − vSC = wF (8)
−wF = 0 ⇒ φI,SI = 0 (9)
Hence, we obtain a relation between the R&D costs and the incremental value that
would result from innovating in both states. Given that the incremental value of a further
innovation for an incumbent in the (SI) state is null in our economy with only two distinct
population groups, we obtain that the optimal investment in R&D in that state is zero.11
From then on, we hence refer to the investment in R&D of the incumbent ﬁrm in the (SC)
state as simply φI.
Using the optimality constraints (8) and (9) in (6) and (7), we obtain the following









We are now left to detail the possible values taken by vF and πSC, which depend on
whether the equilibrium market structure in the (SC) state (depending on the income
distribution within our economy) is a monopoly (Case 1) or a duopoly (Case 2).
• Case 1 - Monopoly price regime in the (SC) state. We then have πSC = πM, and
the value vF of a ﬁrm that has been leap-frogged by a challenger is null: indeed,
the new leader charges a price that captures the whole market, leaving no room for
the producer of the second-best quality. The previous leader then falls back to a
challenger status, and we have vF = vC = 0. Using (5), (8), (10) and (11), we hence
get the two following equalities between incurred costs and expected proﬁts when we
10The challengers invest the same amount in the R&D sector φC in both states (SC) and (SI), since
they face the same expected reward vSC in both cases: a successful innovation by a challenger indeed
always brings the economy back to state (SC).
11We believe it would be possible to generalize our model to more than two groups of population, or a
continuum of quality valuations as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). Intuitively, the incumbent would then keep
investing in R&D beyond the second innovation in a row.









• Case 2 - Duopoly price regime in the (SC) state. We then have πSC = πL, and
the value vF of the previous leader (now producer of the second-best quality) is
strictly positive, since in Case 2 the new leader has optimally chosen to charge a




{πF − wFφF + φF(vSC − vF) + (φC + φI)(vC − vF)} (14)
The follower sells the second-best quality to the lower part of the market, earning
the proﬁts πF. He incurs the R&D costs wFφF. With instantaneous probability
φF, he is successful in innovating once more, and its value jumps back to vSC. With
instantaneous probability φC + φI, either some R&D follower or the current quality
leader innovates, and the follower is deﬁnitively driven out of the market: its value
falls to vC = 0. Solving for an interior solution to this maximization problem yields
the condition vSC − vF = wF, which, combined with condition (5), would imply
vF = 0. This is however not the case, since the follower’s proﬁts πF when the market
structure in the (SC) state is a duopoly are strictly positive. We then necessarily
have φF = 0. Plugging this value back into (14), we obtain that vF = πF
r+φC+φI.
Using (5), (8), (10) and (11), we ﬁnally get the two following equalities between


















5 Steady state equilibrium
5.1 Labor market equilibrium
We have two possible equations describing the equilibrium on the labor market, whether
we are in the (SC) or the (SI) state. The equilibrium on the labor market in the (SC) state
is of the form:
L = F(φI + φC) + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
SC − pP
SC) + (1 − β)(yR
SC − pM)) (17)
15with F(φI + φC) being the number of people hired in the R&D sector, aL being the
number of people hired for the production of the quality good, and ﬁnally L/w(β(yP
SC −
pP
SC) + (1 − β)(yR
SC − pR
SC)) being the number of people devoted to the production of the
standardized good. pP
SC and pR
SC are the prices paid by consumers belonging respectively
to the P and the R group in the (SC) state. Again, the values taken by those two variables
depend on the equilibrium market structure in the (SC) state: pP
SC = pR
SC = pM when the
market structure is a monopoly; pP
SC = pF and pR
SC = pL when the market structure is a
duopoly.
The equilibrium on the labor market in the (SI) state is of the form:
L = FφC + aL + (L/w)(β(yP
SI − pP
SI) + (1 − β)(yR
SI − pR
SI)) (18)
with FφC being the number of people hired in the R&D sector (the incumbent does not
invest in R&D in the (SI) state), aL being the number of people hired for the production
of the quality good, and ﬁnally L/w(β(yP
SI − pP
SI)+ (1 − β)(yR
SI − pR
SI)) being the number
of people devoted to the production of the standardized good.
It will prove convenient to express (17) and (18) in terms of proﬁt ﬂows. Multiplying




SI by their values expressed in Section
3, (17) and (18) respectively yield:






















Splitting waL into βwaL + (1 − β)waL and rearranging terms, as well as distinguishing
between the two possible cases in the (SC) state, we ﬁnally get:
• Case 1 - Monopoly price regime in the (SC) state. We have pP
SC = pR
SC = pM, and
obtain the two following equations deﬁning labor equilibrium in both states:
wFφI + wFφC = πM − rΩSC (19)
wFφC = πSI − rΩSI (20)
• Case 2 - Duopoly price regime in the (SC) state. We have pP
SC = pF and pR
SC = pL,
and obtain the two following equations deﬁning labor equilibrium in both states:
wFφI + wFφC = πF + πL − rΩSC (21)
wFφC = πSI − rΩSI (22)
165.2 Steady state analysis
In order to be able to proceed to a steady state analysis, we ﬁrst need to prove the
existence of a stationary distribution for the stochastic equilibrium market structure M(t).
Proposition 1: The market structure M(t) is a Markov process with state space {(SC),(SI)},





, and transition probability matrix P(∆t) =
I + Q∆t.
Proof: The continuous stochastic process M(t) satisﬁes the Markov property:
P(M(t + ∆t) = k|M(t) = j,M(ti) = xi∀i) = P(M(t + ∆t) = k|M(t) = j)
with k,j ∈ {(SC),(SI)}, t0 < t1 < ... < tn < t and x0,...,xn ∈ {(SC),(SI)}. Indeed, the
current state of the market structure M(t) contains all the information that is needed to
characterize the future stochastic behavior of the process: at a given time t, we only need
to know the realization of the random variable M(t) to be able to compute the probabilities
associated to the possible realizations of M(t + ∆t). We deﬁne as qi,j the probability per
time unit that the system makes a transition from state i to state j:
qi,j = lim
∆t→0
P(M(t + ∆t) = j|M(t) = i)
∆t
Considering the R&D races described in our model, we have qSC,SI = φI and qSI,SC = φC.
Indeed, φI corresponds to the immediate probability for the incumbent to innovate when
in the (SC) state, while φC corresponds to the immediate aggregate probability for a
challenger to innovate, whether it be in the (SC) or the (SI) state.
We deﬁne as qi the total transition rate out of state i, and qi,i = −qi.











and the transition probability matrix over time interval ∆t is P(∆t) = I + Q∆t. Finally,
the embedded (discrete time) Markov chain of the continuous time Markov process M(t)





This ends the proof. ￿
Now that we have determined that M(t) is a Markov process, we still need to prove
that it admits a stationary distribution in order to be able to characterize a steady state
for our economy.
Proposition 2: The Markov process M(t), describing the market structure, admits a sta-








Proof : We deﬁne the state probability vector π(t), being a function of time and evolving
as follows: d
dtπ(t) = π(t) · Q. The stationary solution π = limt→∞ π(t) is independant of
time, and thus satisﬁes π · Q = 0. Being a probability distribution vector, it also satisﬁes






we then have that π · E = e.
Using all those results together, we have that π(Q + E) = e, and hence the stationary
distribution is obtained by solving for π = e · (Q + E)−1, provided Q + E is an invertible
matrix. We have Q + E =
!
1 − φI 1 + φI
1 + φC 1 − φC
#
. This matrix is indeed invertible, with
(Q + E)−1 = 1
−2φC−2φI
!
1 − φC −1 − φI
−1 − φC 1 − φI
#







. This ends the proof. ￿
The steady state equilibrium is hence deﬁned by the overall wealths in both states
ΩSC and ΩSI, as well as the stationary distribution of M, determined by the endogenous
transition rates φI and φC. As already stated, those transition rates are being determined
by the R&D investment decisions of the incumbent (transition from the (SC) to the (SI)
state) and the challengers (transition from the (SI) to the (SC) state), taken according
to the rewards accruing to successful innovators, πSC and πSI. Since those rewards diﬀer
whether we have a monopoly or a duopoly in the (SC) state, we need to distinguish both
cases in the deﬁnition of the steady state:
• Case 1 - Monopoly price regime in the (SC) state. The 4 equations deﬁning the
economy steady state are the equality constraints between the incurred R&D costs
and the expected value of an innovation in both states (12) and (13), as well as the
18labor market equilibrium conditions in both states (19) and (20).
• Case 2 - Duopoly price regime in the (SC) state. The 4 equations deﬁning the
economy steady state are the equality constraints between the incurred R&D costs
and the expected value of an innovation in both states (15) and (16), as well as the
labor market equilibrium conditions in both states (21) and (22).
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of a steady state equilibrium):
• (1) Monopoly price regime in the (SC) state: for β > 0.5, and under the parametric
conditions (i)-(ii) (cf Appendix A) on L
F and k, the system formed by equations (12),
(13), (19) and (20) has a unique solution in (φC,φI,ΩSC,ΩSI), all strictly positive.
• (2) Duopoly price regime in the (SC) state: for r suﬃciently small, the system formed
by equations (15), (16), (21) and (22) has a unique solution in (φC,φI,ΩSC,ΩSI),
all strictly positive.
Proof: cf Appendix A.
Several comments are in order. First, since the equilibrium price regime in the (SC)
case depends on the distribution parameters β and d (cf section 3.1 and section 5.3 below),
it might seem problematic that a condition is made on β for an equilibrium to exist when
we have a monopoly price regime in the (SC) state. However, such a lower bound on β
seems acceptable, since monopoly is anyway only likely to emerge as an equilibrium price
regime for high values of β. Indeed, it is intuitively clear (cf section 5.3) that for the new
leader to accept to charge a lower price in order to capture the poor consumers, those
consumers must not be too poor (low value of d) or too few (low value of β).12
Second and most importantly, we have demonstrated that in an economy where
disparities in purchasing power exist, incumbents have an incentive to keep
investing in R&D beyond their ﬁrst successful innovation. The intuition behind this
result is that leaders participate to the next R&D race because of the positive increment in
proﬁts that exists when innovating for a second time in an economy with wealth inequalities.
Indeed, in our framework, a challenger that has just won the latest innovation race needs
to decide between two alternatives: selling its product to the whole market at a price
being suﬃciently low to attract the poorest households, or extract the maximum surplus
from wealthy consumers by charging a higher price, but at the cost of abandoning the poor
consumers to its direct competitor (i.e. the previous quality leader). Those two alternatives
respectively correspond to Cases 1 and 2 for the (SC) state market structure (monopoly or
duopoly), and the equilibrium price regime is optimally chosen by the successful challenger
according to the wealth distribution within the economy (β and d). However, since he only
has one quality at its disposal, such an innovator cannot eﬃciently exploit the diﬀerences
12It should furthermore be noted that such a condition is suﬃcient but not necessary (cf Appendix A),
and simulations carried out in section 5.3 to determine the equilibrium price regime in the (SC) case also
show that a unique equilibrium exists in Case 1 for β < 0.5 under a wide array of parametric cases.
19in the willingness to pay existing between rich and poor consumers: he always needs to
sacriﬁce either a portion of the maximum price he could charge (Case 1) or a chunk of the
market (Case 2). On the other hand, an incumbent winning an innovation race has two
successive qualities at its disposal: he can thus eﬃciently discriminate between rich and
poor consumers by oﬀering two distinct price/quality bundles, capturing the whole market
and reaping the maximum surplus from the wealthy consumers at the same time.
This result can be commented in the light of the microeconomic literature analyzing
price discrimination by a monopolist having at its disposal a product range including
diﬀerent quality levels. In such a context, Mussa and Rosen (1978) have demonstrated that
serving costumers who place smaller valuations on quality creates negative externalities
for the monopolist, preventing him from capturing the maximum costumer surplus from
those who have a stronger taste for quality. In their static framework, the multi-quality
monopolist then internalizes the existing negative externalities by inducing less enthusiastic
consumers to buy lower quality items charged at a lower price, opening the possibility of
charging higher prices to more adamant buyers of high quality units. In our dynamic model
with endogenous innovation, the monopolist only has access to as many qualities as R&D
races he has won: the negative externalities stemming from having to serve two distinct
groups of consumers having diﬀerent quality valuation is then internalized by expanding
the line of product towards higher (and not lower) qualities, i.e. through R&D investment.
Finally, another implication of this results is that in the case there exist wealth dispar-
ities within an economy, positive investment in R&D by quality leaders is obtained with
complete equal treatment in the R&D ﬁeld between the incumbent patentholder and the
challengers, as well as without any concavity in the R&D cost function. We are indeed
modeling constant returns to R&D investments, and not allowing for any R&D cost ad-
vantage of the incumbent over the followers (Segerstrom and Zolnierek, 1999; Segerstrom,
2007) or any sequentiality in the patent races (Etro, 2008). Our model hence exempliﬁes
the existence of so far overlooked incentives for innovation by incumbent stemming from
the demand structure rather than from the supply side (R&D sector characteristics and
R&D capabilities of challenger and incumbent ﬁrms).
Such a result, beyond its novelty, enables us to furthermore extend and deepen the
study of the impact of income inequality on long term economic growth, by taking into
account investment of both challengers and incumbents. This will be the aim of the next
section. Since the impact of inequalities on growth depends on the price regime in the
(SC) state, we however ﬁrst comment the parametric conditions governing the choice of
the equilibrium price regime when a challenger has won the latest innovation race.
5.3 Selection of the equilibrium price regime in the (SC) state
As noted in section 3.1, the selection of the (deterministic) equilibrium market structure
in the (SC) state is up to the winner of the latest innovation race (i.e. the quality winner),
that chooses the optimal price regime considering the distribution of wealth in the economy.
20Intuitively, a duopoly price regime should arise at equilibrium for low values of β and d:
indeed, for the leader to optimally abandon the poorer consumers to its direct competitor,
the wealthy group of consumers has to be signiﬁcantly richer (d suﬃciently small) or
suﬃciently big (β suﬃciently small). Hence, we expect the equilibrium market structure
to be a monopoly for high values of β and/or high values of d, and to be a duopoly for
low values of β and/or low values of d. More formally, the decision will be taken by the
new leader comparing the expected proﬁts in both cases, assuming the latter anticipates
correctly the overall wealth as well as the R&D investment rates in both cases. The
condition for the leader to choose a monopoly rather than a duopoly market structure is






































with the supercript M (respectively D) describing the value taken by the endogenous vari-
ables in the case of a monopoly (resp. duopoly) price regime in the (SC) state. Although
this condition might seem complex, constant returns to R&D eﬀort at the ﬁrm level enable
us to simplify this expression using (10) and (11). Indeed, whatever the equilibrium price
regime in the (SC) state, expected incremental values φi
CvSC and φi
I(vSI − vSC) of a ﬁrst
and a second innovation have to be equal to the incurred costs, i.e. φi
CwF and φi
IwF. The
above condition then simpliﬁes to wF + 2wFφM
I > wF + 2wFφD
I , i.e. φM
I > φD
I . Deter-
mining the equilibrium market structure in the (SC) state hence amounts to comparing
the investment by incumbent in both possible price regimes. Such a condition implies that
the leader systematically chooses the market structure ensuring him the greatest probabil-
ity of reaching the status of “discriminating” monopolist, i.e. of endogenizing the negative
externalities stemming from wealth inequalities. It is important to keep in mind that this
however does not amount to choosing the case displaying the highest long-term growth
rate, since part of the overall R&D eﬀort is carried out by challengers, and this conditions
gives no information on the respective size of φM
C and φD
C.
We are hence now able to determine the conditions on the wealth distribution param-
eters β and d governing the occurrence of a given case at the equilibrium. Given the
absence of explicit analytical expression of the diﬀerent endogenous variables in the case of
a duopoly price regime (cf. Appendix A), we are left to carry out numerical simulations.
We hence proceed to simulations for β varying from 0,3 to 1, and for d varying from 0,1 to
1, carrying out a sensitivity analysis along diﬀerent values of F, k, a and r. Severel salient
numerical regularities emerge:
• Numerical ﬁnding 1: Under a wide array of parametric cases, a unique steady state
equilibrium with positive (φC,φI,ΩSC,ΩSI) exists under a monopoly price regime in
the (SC) state for values of β inferior to 0.5.
• Numerical ﬁnding 2: For parameter values for which a unique steady state equilib-
rium exists in both cases, the dominant market structure is always a duopoly for
β < 0.5 and a monopoly for β > 0.6 (the market structure for 0.5 < β < 0.6 varies
21along values of F, k, a and d).
• Numerical ﬁnding 3: Except for very high values of the productivity parameter in the
quality good sector a (a > 0.8), varying values of the parameter d do not inﬂuence
the equilibrium price regime for a given β.
• Numerical ﬁnding 4: Whatever the equilibrium price regime, a majority of the R&D
investment in the (SC) state is carried out by the incumbent for low values of the
quality increment k.
Numerical ﬁndings 1 and 2 conﬁrm that the condition imposed on the share of the popula-
tion being poor within the economy (β > 0.5) in order to have a unique and positive steady
state equilibrium in Case 1 (monopoly price regime in the (SC) state) is not problematic.
Indeed, even if a steady state equilibrium exists for lower values of β (Numerical ﬁnding
1), the monopoly market structure only becomes dominant for values of β superior to 0.5
(Numerical ﬁnding 2).
Numerical ﬁndings 2 and 3 state that it is the share of the poor group within the
economy rather than the wealth repartition between the two groups that will determine the
equilibrium price regime in the (SC) state. Hence, it seems that for a successful challenger
having only one quality at its disposal and seeking to maximize its expected proﬁts, the
size of the market matters more than the extent of the immediate price surplus he can
reap. Indeed, even if the rich group concentrates a signiﬁcant part of the overall wealth
(low values of d), the leader will not be ready to abandon the poor group’s consumption
to its competitor if the size of the latter is big enough (high values of β).
Numerical ﬁnding 4, although not related to the conditions for a given price regime
to occur in the (SC) state, is still worth to mention. Indeed, it demonstrates that our
model is able to replicate the stylized fact emphasized by Etro (2008) and Acemoglu and
Cao (2010) that a major bulk of the overall R&D investment is carried out by current
incumbent patentholders. The intuition linking the fraction of overall R&D carried out by
the incumbent and the size of the innovation k is found considering the increment in proﬁts
πSI −πSC when innovating for the second time. For a given level of wealth in both states,
this increment is non-monotonous along k, ﬁrst increasing for k < 2 and then decreasing.
Having established that both price regimes occur at the equilibrium as wealth distri-
bution progresses along the β and d dimensions, we now proceed to studying the impact
on overall growth of the level of inequalities.
6 Distribution of income and long-term growth
Does an increase in the level of inequalities, whether it be through an increasing con-
centration of wealth among a small group of people (increasing β) or a more unequal
distribution of overall wealth between rich and poor (decreasing d) have a positive or nega-
tive impact on the long-run growth rate in a quality-ladder framework? Our models allows
22us to answer that question by studying the impact of the level of inequalities on both the
incumbent’s and the challengers’ investment in R&D, and by extension on long-run growth.
Indeed, the economy growth rate is directly linked to the innovation intensity of both chal-
lengers and leaders, since consumers become better oﬀ due to the successive improvements
of the quality consumption good. More precisely, we have the following relationship:
Proposition 4: The steady state utility growth rate of our economy is γ = (lnk)φC(1 +
φI
φI+φC).
Proof : Considering equation (2) and the fact that in a given state, the consumption of





qi(t). In state (SC), we hence have that γR =
˙ qR(t)
qR(t) = (lnk)(φC + φI) and
γP =
˙ qP(t)
qP(t) = (lnk)(φC). Indeed, if the next innovation race is won by a challenger, the
latter will sell to both population groups the unique quality he has at its disposal, hav-
ing a quality increment k with respect to the previous quality being consumed by both
groups. However, if the next innovation race is won by the incumbent, the latter will
sell the highest quality he has at its disposal to the rich consumers, whose utility will
indeed increase. He will however keep selling the second-best quality to the poor con-
sumers, whose utility will hence not increase following this quality jump. In state (SI),
only challengers carry out R&D, and in the case they win the next innovation race, they
will again sell the highest quality to the two groups of consumers. Hence we have that
γR = (lnk)φC, while γP = 2(lnk)φC. Indeed, the poor consumers were consuming quality
q−1 before the quality jump. Hence, considering the stationary probability distribution
of the market structure, we have that the average utility growth rate of rich consumers
is γR = (lnk)((φC + φI)(
φC
φC+φI ) + φC(
φI
φC+φI)) = (lnk)φC(1 +
φI
φI+φC), while the aver-







φI+φC). This ends the proof. ￿
We consider two types of variations in the extent of wealth disparities: (a) an increase
in β for a given d, and (b) an increase in d for a given β. We obtain analytical results in
the case we have a monopoly price regime in the (SC) state:
Proposition 5 (Wealth distribution and long-term growth):
When the equilibrium market structure is a monopoly in the (SC) state, we have the fol-
lowing comparative statics for varying values of β and d:
• (a) Eﬀect of an increase in the population share of the poor β: the incumbent’s R&D
intensity φI increases along β while the challengers’ innovation rate φC as well as
the overall wealth in both states ΩSC and ΩSI decrease along β.
• (b) Eﬀect of an increase in the relative wealth of poor consumers d: the challengers’
innovation rate φC and the overall wealth in the (SI) state ΩSI increase along d,
23while the directions of variation of the incumbent R&D intensity φI as well as the
overall wealth in the (SC) state ΩSC are ambiguous.
Proof : Full analytical expressions for the above comparative statics can be obtained from
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(k − 1)w(2Fk2r + (1 − a)(k − 1)L(1 + k − β))(1 − β)
r(k(k + 1) − d(k − 1)(1 − β))2 > 0
This ends the proof.￿
(a) Let us ﬁrst comment the eﬀects of an increase in β when we have a monopoly price
regime in the (SC) state. A rise in the share of the population being poor β corresponds
to a growing level of inequalities, since it leads to a higher concentration of wealth through
an increase in the relative income of a rich consumer (∂dR
∂β = 1−d
(1−β)2 > 0): there are more
poor with the same income, and fewer rich with more income. Intuition for the variations
of φC and φI in that case can be gained from considering the resource constraints (19) and
(20), keeping in mind that for given levels of wealth ΩSC and ΩSI, an increase in β leaves
πM unchanged and leads to a decrease in πSI.13 In the (SI) state, a lower πSI means that
a smaller part of the overall wealth of the consumers has been spent on the consumption
of the quality good, leading to a mechanic increase in the consumption of the homogenous
good. Keeping in mind that the labor demand for the production of the quality good is
ﬁxed at aL (unit consumption of the quality good), such an increase in consumption of
the standard good necessarily leads to a labor reallocation from the R&D sector to the
production of the homogenous good sector. Hence, according to the labor constraint (20),
φC drops for an increasing β. Since the right-hand side of the labor constraint in the (SC)
state (19) is left unchanged for a given ΩSC, φI then necessarily needs to rise in order to
compensate the fall in φC.
Beyond labor market considerations, variations in φC and φI following a shock on β
can also be explained considering the variations in expected gains of successfully innovating
for the ﬁrst and the second time. Figure 2 illustrates in both possible cases (monopoly or






24Figure 2: Proﬁts in the (SC) and (SI) states in cases 1 and 2
areas B and C) and the increment in proﬁts of a successful incumbent (resp. areas A and D).
In the case of a monopoly price regime in the (SC) state, variations in the R&D investment
of challengers will depend on variations of the overall area A+B. Indeed, innovating for the
ﬁrst time not only yields immediate proﬁts (B), but also oﬀers the opportunity to enter
the next race as an incumbent, with the expected incremental reward (A). On the other
hand, variations in the R&D investment of the incumbent will only depend on variations
of the area A, corresponding to the increment in proﬁts when innovating a second time.
For given values of ΩSC and ΩSI, an increase in β in Case 1 leaves area B unchanged
and impacts area A through both a positive price eﬀect (the price a successful incumbent
can charge for its highest quality has increased) and a negative market size eﬀect (the
number of people for which he can extract that extra surplus has decreased). Taking into
account the negative variations of ΩSC and ΩSI following an increase in β however changes
the picture: area B shrinks (negative price eﬀect), and the positive price eﬀect on the
incremental proﬁts of an incumbent is mitigated. The two negative eﬀects (negative price
eﬀect on B and negative market size eﬀect on A) on the expected proﬁts of a successful
challenger dominate the positive price eﬀect on A: φC drops. On the other hand, the
incumbent invests in R&D only taking into account the expected incremental gain A: the
positive price eﬀect dominates the negative market size eﬀect, and φI rises.
We have hence demonstrated that an increase in the level of inequalities through a rise
in β unambiguously leads to an increase in R&D intensity of the incumbent φI and a de-
crease in challengers’ R&D investment φC. It is however important to emphasize that the
eﬀect on long-run growth is ambiguous, since the latter depends on both the challengers’
and the incumbent’s investment in R&D: γ = (lnk)φC(1 +
φI
φI+φC). Clear analytical pre-
dictions are not possible to obtain, and we hence carry out simulations for β varying from
0.5 to 0.9 (lower values of β lead to a duopoly market structure in the (SC) case) and for














































Figure 3: Eﬀects of an increase in β under a monopoly price regime in the (SC) case
(r = 0.2, L = 200, F = 120, a = 0.7, d = 0.7, k = 2)
along β, implying a negative relationship between long-run growth and the level of inequali-
ties (as measured by β) when we have a monopoly price regime in the (SC) state (Figure 3).
(b) We now move to comment the eﬀects of an increase in d when we have a monopoly
price regime in the (SC) state. We ﬁrst note that such a rise in the ratio of the wealth of a
poor consumer relative to the average per-capita wealth leads to a decrease in the level of
inequalities. A simple intuition for the positive variation of φC in the case of an increase
in d can then be found by considering the variations in expected gains of successfully
innovating for the ﬁrst and the second time. For given levels of wealth, an increase in d
has a positive price eﬀect on the proﬁts of a successful challenger, since he can charge a
higher price and still capture the whole market (the critical income in the (SC) state is the
income of poor households): area B increases. On the other hand, such an increase in d had
a negative price eﬀect on the incremental proﬁts of a successful incumbent, shrinking area
A. One would then expect an unambiguous decrease in the R&D investment of the current
leader (smaller incremental proﬁts), and an ambiguous variation in the R&D investment
of challengers, who base their decisions on variations in the overall area A+B. Taking into
account the positive variation in ΩSI however modiﬁes the picture, since such an increase
in overall wealth in the (SI) state will at least mitigate and might reverse the negative
impact on area A of a higher d. Indeed, analytical results conﬁrm that the positive price
eﬀect on B always dominates the ambiguous price eﬀect on A, leading to an unambiguous
increase in φC. On the other hand, simulations carried out for a wide array of values of
F, k, a and r show that the leader’s R&D investment φI might decrease or increase along
d, illustrating the ambiguous eﬀect of a variation of d on the incremental proﬁts described
by area A.
We carry out simulations for d varying from 0.1 to 0.9 and for a wide array of values
of F, k, a and r in order to determine the overall impact of an increase in d on long-term
growth. We systematically obtain a positive relationship between the long-run growth rate
and the relative wealth of a poor consumer d (Figure 4 depicts a parametric case where the














































Figure 4: Eﬀects of an increase in d under a monopoly price regime in the (SC) case











































Figure 5: Eﬀects of an increase in β under a duopoly price regime in the (SC) case
(r = 0.2, L = 200, F = 120, a = 0.7, d = 0.3, k = 2)
φI decreases along d). In other words, we ﬁnd a decreasing level of inequalities (modeled
through variations in d) to have a positive impact on long-term growth when we have a
monopoly market structure in the (SC) state.
In the case of a duopoly price regime in the (SC) state, the absence of explicit analytical
expression of the diﬀerent endogenous variables (cf. Appendix A) leads us to resort to
numerical simulations. We carry out a sensitivity analysis along a wide array of values for
parameters F, r, a and k, and the following numerical regularities emerge:
• Numerical ﬁnding 5: When the equilibrium market structure is a duopoly in the (SC)
state, an increase in β leads to a decrease in both the incumbent’s and the challengers’
investment in R&D under a wide array of parametric cases. The long-run growth
rate then unambiguously decreases (Figure 5).
• Numerical ﬁnding 6: When the equilibrium market structure is a duopoly in the
(SC) state, an increase in d decreases the incumbent’s but increases the challengers’
investment in R&D and the long-run growth rate under a wide array of parametric
cases (Figure 6).
Two main conclusions can be derived from the results presented in this section. First,














































Figure 6: Eﬀects of an increase in d under a duopoly price regime in the (SC) case
(r = 0.2, L = 200, F = 120, a = 0.7, β = 0.4, k = 2)
of wealth among a small group of people (increasing β) or a more unequal distribution of
overall wealth between rich and poor (decreasing d) is systematically detrimental for long-
term growth. Indeed, whether we have a monopoly or a duopoly market structure in the
(SC) state, our analytical results and our simulations show that a rise in β or a decrease
in d lead to a decrease in the long-run growth rate of the economy. Second, reactions to a
variation in the level of inequalities diﬀer greatly between incumbents and challengers. A
decrease in the level of inequalities through a rise in d for example systematically triggers
opposite variations in the leader’s and the challengers’ R&D intensity, whether we have
a monopoly or a duopoly price regime in the (SC) state: φI decreases, while φC rises.
Hence, beyond the evolution of long-run growth, the level of inequalities also inﬂuences the
allocation of the overall R&D eﬀort among challengers and leaders: in most cases, greater
disparities in wealth distribution imply that a bigger share of the overall R&D investment
will be carried out by the incumbent. Indeed, a greater level of inequalities yields stronger
negative externalities on the proﬁts of the quality leader having innovated only once, and
will increase its incentive to invest in R&D in order to be able to eﬃciently discriminate
between rich and poor consumers.
We hence contribute to the analysis of the inﬂuence of wealth disparities on long-run
growth operating through the demand side. Our results conﬁrm the predictions obtained
by Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) in a similar quality-ladder framework: a reduction in
the level of inequalities leads to an increase in long-run growth. Furthermore, by being
able to diﬀerentiate the impact of variations in the level of inequalities on the incumbent’s
and the challengers’ investment in R&D, we exemplify a so far overlooked inﬂuence of
wealth distribution on the allocation of R&D spending between the leader and the chal-
lengers. Finally, it is interesting to notice that while we obtain a negative relationship
between inequalities and growth in a Schumpeterian creative destruction context, Foellmi
and Zweimuller (2006) had exempliﬁed a positive one in an horizontal innovation frame-
work. Such opposite results can be explained by the fundamental diﬀerences existing in
the nature of innovation between the two frameworks, and its inﬂuence on the market
structure.
287 Conclusion
In this paper we provided two major contributions to the analysis of the impact of
inequalities on long-term growth operating through the demand side. We ﬁrst show that
disparities in purchasing power justify investment in R&D by both leaders and challengers,
providing a demand-driven rationale for innovation by incumbents. By introducing non-
homothetic preferences in an otherwise standard quality-model, we show that the perspec-
tive to discriminate eﬃciently between consumers diﬀering in their willingness to pay for
quality is suﬃcient for the industry leader to overcome the Arrow (1962) eﬀect and keep
investing in R&D. The strictly positive innovation rate of the incumbent is here obtained
with constant returns to R&D eﬀorts and without any advantage of the incumbent in the
R&D ﬁeld (supply side), by allowing for income inequalities to generate diﬀerent quality
valuation of poor and rich consumers (demand side). Second, we then study the impact of a
variation in the level of inequalities on long-run growth, and obtain a negative relationship
between inequalities and growth. Finally, we show that the level of inequalities impacts
not only the long-term growth rate, but also the allocation of the R&D eﬀort between
challengers and leaders.
Some lines of further work can be quickly sketched. An obvious extension to our model
would be to treat the more general case of more than two types of consumers, in order
for the incumbent to keep investing in R&D after the second successful race.14 A model
such as ours can also be extended to a two-country framework, in order to contribute to
the developing literature studying the role of multi-product ﬁrms in international trade
(Fajgelbaum et al., 2011): while the impact on growth of inter-industrial quality trade has
already been extensively studied (product life cycle), we believe our framework would be
a good starting point for the elaboration of a dynamic model of intra-industrial quality
trade (quality life cycle).
14Indeed, as already pointed out, the null investment in R&D by the incumbent in the (SI) state solely
stems from the fact that we have only two distinct groups of consumers: once having oﬀered two distinct
price-quality bundles, the incumbent does not have any incentive to keep carrying out R&D.
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31Appendix A
Monopoly in the (SC) state
We ﬁrst notice that πM and πDL are linear functions of respectively ΩSC and ΩSI.
The stationarized steady state Markovian equilibrium deﬁned by equations (12), (13), (19)
and (20) is hence a linear system of 4 equations with 4 unknowns which can be solved
analytically:
φC =
(1 − a)(k − 1)L(k + 1 − β) − 2Fr(k − (k − 1)d(1 − β))
F(k(k + 1) − d(k − 1)(1 − β))
(23)
φI =
(1 − a)L(β − (k − 1)(1 − β)) + Fr(kβ − d2(k − 1)(1 − β))
F(k(k + 1) − d(k − 1)(1 − β))
(24)
ΩSC =
w(d(1 − β)((1 − a)(k − 1)L + Fkr) + k(Fkr − (1 − a)βL))
F(k(k + 1) − d(k − 1)(1 − β))
(25)
ΩSI =
w(2Fk2r + (1 − a)(k − 1)L(k + 1 − β))
F(k(k + 1) − d(k − 1)(1 − β))
> 0 (26)
Since we have a < 1, β < 1 and k > 1, ΩSI is positive without any further condition
on the parameters. It can be seen from (23) and (25) that for both φC and ΩSC to be
simultaneously positive, we need for the ratio L
F to respect the following condition:
2r(k − (k − 1)d(1 − β))







kr(k + d(1 − β))




Imposing k ≥ 2 guarantees that the numerator and the denominator of the upper bound
UB are respectively greater and smaller than the numerator and the denominator of the
lower bound LB, hence ensuring that the interval [LB,UB] is not empty. Finally, it can
be seen from (24) that a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for φI to be positive is
k ≤ 1
1−β, since it guarantees for the two terms of the numerator to be positive. We then
have two conditions on k, that can be summarized as:




The interval [2, 1
1−β] is non empty provided β > 0.5. Hence, for β > 0.5 and under
the parametric conditions (i)-(ii), the system {(12),(13),(19),(20)} has a unique solution
(φC,φI,ΩSC,ΩSI), all strictly positive.
32Duopoly in the (SC) state
We ﬁrst notice that πL, πF and πDL can be re-expressed as πL = Al + BlΩSC, πF =

































r(k + (1 − β)d)
We also have Al + Af = Adl and Bl + Bf = Bdl.
Considering the stationarized steady state Markovian equilibrium deﬁned by the system of
equations {(15),(16),(21),(22)}, it is possible to obtain the following expressions for φC
and ΩSI:














Since r − Bdl > 0, we have ΩSI > 0 provided there exists an equilibrium with ΩSC and
φI positive. The sign of φC is on the other hand ambiguous, but a suﬃcient condition to






Substituting for ΩSI and φC using (27) and (28), the R&D free-entry condition in the (SC)
state (15) and the labor equilibrium condition in the (SC) state (21) yield two implicit
functions ΩSC = ψR(φI) and ΩSC = ψL(φI). ψR and ψL are implicitly deﬁned by writing
(15) and (21) respectively as R(φI,ΩSC) = 0 and L(φI,ΩSC) = 0, with:





Af − wFr + BfΩSC +
BdlwFφI
r−Bdl


















∂R/∂φI . We have:
∂R
∂ΩSC




Af − wFr + BfΩSC +
BdlwFφI
r−Bdl





>0 under the conditions ensuring φC>0
−Bf (Af + BfΩSC)
!
wF(r + φI)












+ (Af + BfΩSC)
!
wF(Af + BfΩSC + r)





>0 for ΩSC, φI>0
> 0
We can then conclude that
∂ψL
∂φI > 0 for ΩSC, φI > 0. Hence, in the plane (ΩSC,φI)
33with ΩSC > 0 and φI > 0, the function ΩSC = ψR(φI) (R-line) has a positive slope, and
the function ΩSC = ψL(φI) (L-line) has a negative slope. We then only need to prove




I0) = 0 and ψL(φL
I0) = 0. Computing those two roots amounts to solving
for R(φR




I0,0) = 0 ⇔ φ
R
I0 =
(Al − Af)(r − Bdl)r ± (r − Bdl)wF
p




I0,0) = 0 ⇔ φ
L
I0 =
(Al + rwF)(r − Bdl)
rwF
> 0
Since we have demonstrated that ψR is monotonically decreasing in φI for φI, ΩSC > 0,





2rBdl(wF)2 and the unique root of ψL that can
be re-expressed as φL
I0 =
2wFBdl(Al+rwF)(r−Bdl)
2rBdl(wF)2 , we then see that given the conditions on
the parameters of the model, we necessarily have that φR
I0 < ψL
I0. This ensures that the
R-line and the L-line have a unique intersection for ΩSC > 0 and φI > 0.
We have hence demonstrated that for r small enough there exists a unique, positive equi-
librium to the system {(15),(16),(21),(22)} in (φC,φI,ΩSC,ΩSI), all strictly positive.
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